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Mathematical and Statistical
Probability As a Test of
Circumstantial Evidence
Thomas H. Liddle III
Mr. Liddle feels that one of the main problems engendered by science
for the law involves the utility of probability theory to the law of evidence.
The author's contention is that the difficulty has arisen as a direct result
of the law's misapplication of probability theory. Thus, following a
brief introduction to the mathematical theory, he traces its use in the
courts, showing that probability itself is no stranger to law as witness the
devices of judicial notice and legal presumptions. The argument is then
conclusively made that probability theory does have utility in law, but that
its greatest use is in that area where a number of past events may ration-
ally bear on the probability of the occurrence of a future event. Even
then, however, the selection of variables and the assigning of odds to
each variable remain perplexing problems. The author concludes that
variables should be selected by lawyers, as they have the knowledge best
suited to determining relevancy, but that odds should be assigned by scien-
tific experts. Courts should be cautious, but not afraid, in using proba-
bility theory, for, if properly applied, it can be of great value in the truth-
determining process.
I. INTRODUCTION
IAW AND SCIENCE were once allies; they parted ways, and
perhaps now the two disciplines are seeking to draw closer
together again. Indeed, Professor Cowan has suggested that, if the
mountain of technology will not come to the law, perhaps the law
should consider going to the
technological mountain.'
THE AUTHOR: THOMAS H. LIDDLE III On a less philosophical
(B.S. Ch. E., University of Tennessee;
LL.B., Rutgers, The State University) is level, we know that there are
a practicing attorney in New York City certain scientific or technical
and a member of the New Jersey and disciplines that can be and
New York Bars.
have been applied to the law.2
It is the purpose of this article
to suggest one scientific discipline that may be applied to law and
to call attention to the fact that this particular technology - mathe-
1 Cowan, Decision Theory in Law, Science and Technology, 17 RUTGERS L. REv.
499, 502-05 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Kort, Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of
Judicial Decisions, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 143 (1963). Professor Cowan also
discusses some of the applications of sophisticated scientific methods to the decision-
making process which are of particular interest to the lawyer. A generous bibliography
is included. Cowan, supra note 1.
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matical probability - although used rather sparsely in the case law,
has been accepted and its use taken for granted by the law in ap-
plications that may not be immediately apparent. A critical analysis
of its usage in these areas and in others where it may be applied in
the future will then be made. Finally, the article will consider to
what extent and with what limitations mathematical probability and
statistics can and should be used in the judicial process.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Mathematical Probability
Probability may be expressed as a percentage (10 percent, 50
percent, 99 percent) or as odds (10 to 1 against, or 3 to 2 for) or
as a fraction or decimal (1/2, 0.5). No matter how it is expressed,
it represents the proportion that favorable events and unfavorable
events bear to each other and to the total number of events.8 Thus,
s (a) If, consistent with conditions S, there are n exhaustive, mutually exclusive
events, and equally likely cases, and m of them are favorable to an event A, then the
mathematical probability of A is defined as the ratio m/v, or
P(A) =Number of ways (m) event (A) may occur
Total number of events (v) which cat occur
Example 1: The probability that one toss of a coin will result in a head, since either
of two possible events (head or rail) is equally likely to occur, is:
m/ = 1/2
Exampkle 2: In rolling a pair of dice once, what is the probability that the sum of
the face numbers will be 7? Since there are two devices (two dice) and each device
has six possible faces, the total number of chances is (C") or 6' = 36. Because the
favorable event may occur in six different ways ([1,6], [2,5], [3,4], [4,3], [5,2], [6,1]),
P = 6/36 = 1/6. We may also express this as the sum of several products. If we
consider each die separately and each favorable event separately, the probability that
face number (1) will appear on one roll of die = 1/6, and the probability that face
number (6) will appear on one roll of die2  - 1/6. The probability that the simul-
taneous roll of die1 and die2 will yield (1) and (6) respectively is given by the product
of their separate probabilities: 1/6 X 1/6 = 1/36. See note 9 infra. Since the sum
of 7 may occur in ways other than (1,6), the probability of rolling two dice simulta-
neously and yielding 7 is given by the sum of separate probabilities of each of the ways 7
will obtain:
1/36+1/36+1/36+1/36+1/36+1/36 = 6/36
(b) The probability that one of several mutually exclusive events will occur is the
sum of their separate probabilities. (The addition theorem: P(A+A,) = P (A,)+
P(A2).)
Example: What is the probability of rolling 6 or 8 in one roll of a pair of dice?
For (6): P6 = 5/36
For (8) : Ps = 5/36
Pas = P0+P8 = 5/18(c) Conditional probability, or the probability of the successive occurrence of two
events A, and A:, is given by the product of the unconditional probability of event A,
and the conditional probability of event A, which assumes the occurrence of A,.
P(AIA. . . A.-2,A.) = P(A,) X P(A2) ... P(A-,) X P(A.)
Example: A box contains seven balls - three red, four black. If two balls are se-
lected at random from the box, what is the probability that they will both be black?
Let Pb = probability of drawing first one black ball, and Pb2 = conditional probability
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if a coin is tossed there is one chance of a head and one of a tail,
and each chance is equally likely to occur. Hence the chance of a
tail may be expressed as 1/2, 50 percent, 0.50, or "even money."
The probability of obtaining two tails in two tosses is given by
the product of the probabilities of each toss,4 and may be calculated
by multiplying the fractions or decimal expressions of the proba-
bility. Thus the probability of getting two tails in two tosses is
0.5 X 0.5 - 0.25, or 1/2 X 1/2 - 1/4, or 25 percent.5 The odds
against are 3 to 1, .75, 3/4, or 75 percent. In the fractional or deci-
mal system, absolute certainty or a "no unfavorable events" condi-
tion is one, and minimum probability or "no favorable events" is
zero.
More generally, if we consider two events, Ai and A2, one may
be interested in knowing whether both Al and A2 will occur simul-
taneously or successively. The joint event will be denoted by the
product of the individual probabilities of events Ai and A2.' On
the other hand, one may be interested in knowing whether at least
one of the events Al and A2 will occur. This event will be denoted
by the sum of the individual probabilities of Al and A2. At least
one of the two events will occur if A. occurs but A2 does not, or if
A2 occurs but Al does not, or if both Al and A2 occur.' Thus, the
of drawing second another black ball: Pb- = 4/7. After drawing the first black ball,
three remain, thus:
Pb,= = 3/6
Pbb = (Pb) X (Pb2 ) = (4/7) X (3/6) =-2/7
P. HOEL, INTRODUCTiON TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS §§ 2.2.-2.10, at 4-18 (2d ed.
1954).
4 See note 3 (c) supra.
5 The probability of tails on three successive tosses is determined by the general ex-
pression: The probability of event A taken -n times = (PA)".
(0.5)3 - 0.125.
The probability of any number (n) of successive tails is expressed as (0.5)". See note
3 supra.
6 P. HOEL, supra note 3, S 2.5, at 7.
7Id.
Example 1: One box contains two white and two black balls; a second box contains
two white and four black balls. If one box is selected at random and one ball is drawn
from it, what is the probability that it will be a white ball? This involves a combina-
tion of conditional probability and mutually exclusive events. It makes no difference
which box is selected first - it is an independent choice; but it is also a mutually ex-
clusive choice, since if the first box is selected, the second box cannot be. However,
once that choice (step one of event A,) is made, the selection of a ball from that box(step two of event A,) is dependent upon it. Thus the conditional probability of event
one (box (1), white ball) is given by the relationship defined in note 3(c) supra:
P(A1 ) = P(Ai-,1) X P(Ai-,2) = 1/2 X 1/2 = 1/4
and the conditional probability of event two (box (2), white ball) = 1/2 X 1/3 =
1/6. Since events A, and A2 are mutually exclusive, the probability of either occurring
is given by the relationship defined in note 3 (b) supra:
P(A,A 2) = P(A,)+P(A2 ) = 1/4+1/6 = 5/12.
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probability of having either heads or tails on one toss of a coin is
0.5 + 0.5 = 1. It is a certainty.
B. Probability in the Courts - Some Illustrative Cases
As a starting point for examining the relationship of mathemati-
cal probability to the judicial process, a brief survey of several early
cases of note may be helpful.
In People v. Risley,8 the defendant was prosecuted for offering
into evidence at an earlier trial a typewritten document, which he
allegedly knew had been fraudulently altered by the insertion of the
two words "the same." At the trial the State offered as an expert
witness a university professor of mathematics. He testified that the
probability of the same defects found in the six letters allegedly in-
serted in the document (which corresponded to the defects in the
same six letters when typed on a machine owned by the defendant)
appearing in a typewriter other than the one which actually typed
the words was one in 4 billion. This figure was deduced by multi-
plying together the separate probabilities' that each of the individ-
ual defects would occur independently. The Court of Appeals of
New York ruled that the expert's testimony was erroneously ad-
mitted into evidence, and reversed the conviction. The finding of
error was based first on a lack of qualification by the witness as an
expert in typewriting and second on the fact that he did not take
into consideration the effect of the human operation of the machine.
Some writers' ° have supported the Risley holding as justified on
the ground that the witness did not know enough about typewriters
to accurately assign to each particular defect the odds against its ap-
pearance. The criticism was not of the selection of factors - the
defects - nor of the application itself of the rule of compound
Example 2: A box contains two white and four black balls. What is the probability
of selecting one of each color on two successive draws? The first draw is independent
and may occur in one of two ways (white or black); but once the first choice is made,
the second depends upon it in order to meet the conditions set - one white, one black.
If black is drawn first, P = 2/3 X 2/5 = 4/15. If white is drawn first, P - 1/3 X
4/5 = 4/15. Since events Az (first draw) and A2 (second draw) are not mutually
exclusive, we use the multiplication theorem of note 3 (c) supra, and not the addition
theorem of note 3(b) supra.
8214 N.Y. 75, 108 N.E. 200 (1915). See generally Annot., 106 A.L.R. 730-32
(1937).
9 Based on the law of compound probability. This law provides that the probability,
P, of the simultaneous occurrence of independent events A1,, A2. A3... A. is given by
the product of their separate probabilities. Thus
P = (PI) (P2) (Pa) ... (P.).
P. HOEL, supra note 3, §§ 2.6, 2.7, at 8-10.
OE.g., C. McCORM cK, EVIDENcE § 171 (1954).
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probability to the odds against each defect. However, the follow-
ing remarks of Justice Seabury, dissenting in Risley, seem more
persuasive:
Common sense at once recognizes how remote is the proba-
bility that all of these defects should recur in these six identical
letters in any other typewriter. Indeed, if the district attorney,
basing his argument upon matters of common knowledge and the
general perception of all men, had pointed out that there was
not one chance in four thousand millions that these identical de-
fects would be found in these identical six letters of another type-
writer, he would, I think, have been within his rights. Substan-
tially the same statement did not become prejudicial because it
is made by one learned in the higher mathematics."
It would seem that the Court of Appeals of New York was mis-
taken in its basis for finding error in the admission of the expert
testimony. One writer stated: "The obvious though unsound ob-
jection to the admission of such evidence [as in the Risley case] is
that it is an opinion by a witness no more expert in the sort of
phenomena under investigation - typewriters - than the jury."' 2
But was the expert testifying as to his opinion concerning type-
writers, or was the subject a mathematical postulate applied to cer-
tain known and determinable and undisputed facts about the ma-
chine? It is fundamental to the law of evidence that one possessing
special skill or knowledge concerning the sort of phenomena under
investigation, and whose opinion will therefore be of assistance, will
be permitted to express an opinion as to the probability of an oc-
currence."a It seems equally in accord with the spirit of the "opin-
ion rule" to allow the same sort of testimony by one who, although
without special knowledge of facts, is skilled in the specialized
method of treating the facts, provided his method is of value.14
It should be parenthetically pointed out that the court was mis-
informed if it meant to suggest anything other than that an added
variable in the form of the human operation would increase the
probability against such a duplication of defects in another type-
writer.'
In a case decided prior to Risley, the Supreme Court of Utah
discussed the same identification problem concerning typewriter
IPeople v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 95, 108 N.E. 200, 206 (1915).
12Note, Evidential Use of Mathematically Determined Probability, 28 HARV. L. REV.
693, 694 (1915).
136 J. WIGMOE, EvIDENcE § 1976 (3d ed. 1940).
14 Id. § 1923.
15 See P. HOEL, supra note 3.
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defects, but did not assign numerical values to the probability of
the occurrence of the separate defects.1" The defendant had sworn
to certain affidavits which were filed in the case. The State sought
to show that typewritten letters received by the prosecuting witness
were typed on the same typewriter as defendant's affidavits, by show-
ing that it was highly unlikely that two machines would have the
same defects. An expert testified that, while it might be possible
for two machines to have precisely the same defects and to produce
the same faulty printing in every respect that characterized the let-
ters and affidavit, such a coincidence is not at all probable. The
testimony was held to be admissible."
The famous Howland Will Case,"8 certain facts of which are
reported in an earlier account of another trial of the same case,
Robinson v. Mandell,"9 is cited in the Risley opinion. Professor
Benjamin Pierce of Harvard College, a noted mathematician, dis-
cussed the mathematical implications of the case: "In the case of
Sylvia Ann Howland this phenomena [that two signatures of the
same person made at different times could be identical in every re-
spect unless one was copied over the other] could occur only once
in the number of times expressed by the 30th power of 5 or 2666
x 1018 [sic] ... ,,20
Plaintiff's counsel, however, had shown that, of 110 copies of
President John Quincy Adams' signature, 12 could be superimposed
upon one another. He had also shown a remarkable similarity
among a number of signatures of several other witnesses. While
this does not allow the inference that Sylvia Ann Howland's signa-
ture had the same similarity, it would certainly tend to reduce the
probability against one exactly duplicating his own signature at
some later time. The point should be noted, and will later be ex-
amined in detail,"' that the crucial issue involves the assigning of
initial odds to each separate event, rather than in the use of the con-
ditional probability theory to predict a result.2
'
6 State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 P. 447 (1906).
17 Id. at 443, 85 P. at 449.
18 The Howland Will Case, 4 AM. L. REV. 625 (1870).
19 20 F. Cas. 1027 (No. 11, 959) (C.C.D. Mass. 1868).
20The Howland Will Case, 4 AM. L. REV. 625, 649 (1870). It should be noted
that the 30th power of 5 is 931 X 10'.
2 1 Text accompanying notes 63 & 64 infra.
22 See section VII infra.
19681
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:254
III. THE LEGAL PROBABILITY SPECTRUM
Now that we have seen the form in which mathematical proba-
bility theory appears in the legal process, it is in order to consider
the extent to which it is recognized and accepted by the courts in
the context of legal standards. This may be best appreciated by
visualizing a spectrum of "probability" running from conclusive-
ness to uncertainty.
A. Judicial Notice
Courts have dealt with and have allowed juries to deal with
predictions and probability estimates of future events based on fre-
quency statistics. Mortality tables, as one of the bases for predict-
ing length of life, are an example.23
Mortality or actuarial tables showing the probable continuance
of the life of a person at different ages, as distinguished from the
duration of the ability to earn money or perform work, have been
regarded as impartial and disinterested and so nearly in the nature
of an exact science or mathematical demonstration as to be credible
and valuable. The Supreme Court recognized this as long ago as
1898.' There seems to be little doubt that mortality tables are
admissible as evidence of the life expectancy of a person where such
a determination is in issue.25 The tables are used so frequently that
most courts have taken judicial notice of their validity without re-
quiring authentication. 6
It has been recognized in a number of cases that the testimony
of an actuary or mathematician is admissible on the question of the
present value of the permanent loss or impairment of earning ca-
pacity. 7 Similarly the testimony of actuaries or mathematicians has
23 See, e.g., Pollack v. Pollack, 39 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App. Comm. 1931). A prom-
ised to pay B $5000 per year for the rest of B's life, upon condition that, if A predeceased
B, the payment would cease and A would devise $100,000 to B. A breached; B sued
for the full value of A's promises. The court employed an actuarial table to calculate
the probability of the contingency, and determined that A's life expectancy was 11.67
years.
24 Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 173 U.S. 1 (1898).
25 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1698; Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability
Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961); see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d
419 (1956).
26 Immel, Actuarial Tables and Damage Awards, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 240, 245 n.17
(1958).
27 Cases of this type are collected in Annot., 79 A.LR.2d 275 (1961). See gener-
ally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 25.8, 25.14 (1956).
PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE
been admitted in evidence on the question of the present value of
pecuniary loss in wrongful death actions.28
The scientific method, as embodied in actuarial tables based on
statistical verification, blood tests based on biological verification,
and fingerprints based on physiological verification, reveals empiri-
cal verification of a probability approaching certainty. To the scien-
tist, although perhaps not yet to the lawyer, these methods produce
such a high degree of uniformity and reproducibility of results that
he can make predictions and identifications that may be taken as
certain or conclusive.29
It is well established that evidence as to the correspondence of
fingerprints is admissible at the trial of a cause to prove identity."
Although blood tests should also be included at this end of the
probability spectrum," not all jurisdictions have accorded conclu-
siveness to blood test results showing nonpaternity. The New York
courts seem to hold the exclusionary blood test to be conclusive evi-
dence of nonpaternity when the jury believes that the test was per-
formed correctly." This position is quite similar to that taken by a
New Jersey court in Cortese v. Cortese." Although many States
consider such evidence admissible but not conclusive, 4 New Jersey
is one of a growing list of jurisdictions which either by statute or
judicial decision accord conclusive weight to blood grouping test
results which exclude paternity."
It is dear that not all States give conclusive weight to blood
tests in appropriate cases, and thus one may suggest that the inclu-
sion of such tests at this end of the spectrum is somewhat suspect.
28 Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E.R.R., 8 IMI. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956); C. Mc-
CORMIcK & W. FRiTz, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON DAMAGES 278 (2d ed. 1952);
Annot., 79 A.LR.2d 259 (1961). But cf. Note, 18 RuTGERS L. REv. 875, 884 n.57
(1964).
2 9 See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 10, § 171, at 364.
80 See Annot., 63 A.LR. 1324 (1929).
81 See Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 466 (1958); Note, Evidence: Conclusiveness of the Exclusionary Blood Test, 17
OKLA. L. REV. 201 (1964).
32 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1 App. Div. 2d 312, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1956);
Clark v. Rysedorph, 281 App. Div. 121, 118 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1952).
3 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 -(App. Div. 1950). The court observed that
blood tests cannot always prove paternity, but can disprove it conclusively in a great
many cases provided that they are administered by qualified experts. Id. at 156, 76 A.2d
at 719, citing Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
84 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 165(a)-(b).
35 At least six States have adopted the UNIFORM AcT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETER-
MINE PATERNIY, which recognizes the conclusiveness of blood tests to establish non-
paternity. Note, supra note 31, at 203, 205 n.28.
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However, rejection by the courts of evidence which reaches nearly
maximum certainty as a matter of mathematical probability must
surely be bewildering to nonlegal folk. It is highly doubtful that
much of the evidence routinely admitted by all courts reaches that
degree of certainty.
The argument, then, is for judicial acceptance as conclusive of
blood tests whose results approach maximum certainty as a matter
of mathematical probability. 6 The chance that a putative father
will be excluded by blood tests when in fact he is the father is
1/10,000.7 This is the biological certainty. The position that
such tests should be conclusive is based on the presupposition that
the evidential reliability (legal certainty) is equal to the biological
certainty.3" If every woman giving birth came before a judge and
he adopted the rule of accepting the mother's declaration when it
agreed with the blood test and otherwise rejecting it, he would give
a correct decision in 9999 out of 10,000 cases. Here the legal cer-
tainty equals the biological certainty. But if the judge decides only
those cases in which the mother's testimony is contrary to the blood
tests, the question becomes whether the judge would give a correct
decision in 9999 out of 10,000 cases if he were to follow the same
rule, i.e., excluding the mother's claim when it contradicts the blood
test results. There is no reason to believe that the exceptions to the
biological rule would occur in the same proportion (1 in 10,000)
within that narrower area which represents legal action, unless the
area were selected in a way unrelated to parentage, such as by draw-
ing lots, and not through the mother's testimony.39
Professor Ross suggests that, if we take a sample of 100,000
births, 10 exceptions, and 100 cases which under our hypothesis of
conflicting testimony and test results lead to legal action, the ques-
tion becomes whether the distribution of the exceptions between the
100 cases and the 99,900 consistent situations is in the same propor-
tion as the biological certainty (1 in 10,000).40 He argues that
the legal certainty will be less than the biological certainty, although
still high enough to be given conclusive effect, because it is de-
pendent upon (1) the number of legal actions in relation to the
36 See authorities cited note 31 supra.
37 Ross, supra note 31, at 471.
38 Id. at 472.
39 Id. at 473-74.
40 Id. at 475.
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number of possible exceptions and (2) the average truthfulness of
mothers.41
B. Presumptions
At the next level in the hierarchy of judicial conclusiveness are
found legal presumptions. The operation of presumptions, and
their ultimate dependence for their validity upon mathematical prin-
ciples, is best illustrated by the familiar "intoxication statutes."
There are several tests used to determine intoxication in motor
vehicle violations, including the chemical analysis of blood, urine,
breath, or other bodily substances, all of which give rise to presump-
tions. Medical science has established that it is not the amount of
alcohol consumed by the person that affects his driving ability, but
rather the amount of alcohol absorbed into his blood and thus cir-
culated to his brain and central nervous system.
42
Many State legislatures have adopted rebuttable presumptive
statutory standards for intoxication which are admissible provided
the test is given within a prescribed time and administered by com-
petent personnel.43 In McKay v. State"4 a Texas court refused to
adopt such a test for what seems to be the wrong reason. The court
based its rejection on a challenge of the accuracy of such tests to
establish the alcohol content of a subject's blood. It would seem
obvious even to the layman that a court is not competent to chal-
lenge the empirical test results of so elementary a scientific determi-
nation as the one in question.
A more reasonable and valid criticism is the reliability of the
premise on which the presumption is based. Surely a court would
be correct in questioning the premise that medical science has con-
clusively established that an alcohol content in the blood of more
than 0.15 percent constitutes absolute intoxication without regard
to the subject. In order to test this premise, sound mathematical
probability theory would require actual experimentation upon a
411d.
4 2 C. O'HARA & J. OSTERBERG, INTRODUCTtoN TO CRiMINALIsTics 349 (1949);
C. McCoRIMcK, supra note 10, § 176.
43 Note, Evidence: Scientific Devices: Use of Chemical Tests for Determining .I-
toxication, 1 U.C.LA.L. RBv. 610, 611 & n.10 (1954). A typical statute provides the
following test results as giving rise to presumptions: "(1) less than .05% by weight of
alcohol in the blood - not under the influence; (2) at least .05% but less than .15%
- no presumption either way; (3) .15% or over - presumed under the influence."
Id. at 612 n.11. The writer discusses the extent to which judicial notice is taken of these
test results as fact.
44 235 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).
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sufficiently large sampling of human subjects. Even then, some
margin for statistical error, however small, would remain. It is,
therefore, the mathematical translation of the test results into a
legal conclusion that is subject to question, not the test results them-
selves.
C. Probability as a Test for Predictability and Identification
Judicial notice and legal presumptions involve the introduction
into evidence of data whose reliability is attested to by the scientific
method of factfinding - unemotional, objective, controlled, and
impartial. Such data has a quality of predictability, certainty, or,
if you will, "probability," which is translatable into numerical values
and approaches a magnitude which the mathematician or scientist
would accept as conclusive. Blood type tests, fingerprints, and
actuarial tables are examples of such data. Because of their re-
liability and certainty, we may predict a pattern of future events
based upon a large number of past events using actuarial tables,
ascertain specific facts about past events using blood type tests
(where the biological error is 1 in 10,000), and make highly cer-
tain identifications regarding past events using fingerprint data.
Further along the spectrum is the use of compound probability
theory to find or identify facts about past events, based on the no-
tion that it is highly unlikely that any fact or event other than the
one proposed would satisfy all of the given conditions. Thus, for
example, an identification may be sought to be established by iso-
lating individual characteristics or conditions and assigning odds cor-
responding to their occurrence or frequency of appearance in a given
system. The odds either favoring or against their individual occur-
rence are not so high as to provide any reliable basis for identifica-
tion, but taken collectively, the odds rise rapidly against all of them
occurring again, in the same combination, in another event.
An extreme use of this application of the laws of mathematical
probability is found in a recent criminal case in San Pedro, Cali-
fornia. A woman was mugged; a witness saw a blonde, ponytailed
girl run out of an alley, enter a yellow car driven by a bearded
Negro, and speed away. The prosecutor at the trial invoked a test
of circumstantial evidence based on the laws of statistical probabil-
ity. After an expert witness testified as to the mathematical calcu-
lation of the probability that a set of events will occur at once, the
prosecutor asked the jury to consider the six known factors in the
case: (1) a blonde white woman, (2) a ponytail hairdo, (3) a
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bearded man, (4) a Negro man, (5) a yellow car, and (6) an
interracial couple. He assigned probability factors ranging from
4-to-1 odds that a girl in San Pedro would be blonde to 1000-to-1
odds that the couple would be interracial. Multiplied together,45
the factors produced odds of 1 in 12 million that this couple could
have been duplicated in San Pedro on the morning of the crime.
They were convicted by the jury of second-degree robbery.4"
While it may seem at once apparent to the reader that this
analysis of circumstances is highly questionable, it is submitted that
its fault lies not with probability theory itself, but rather in its mis-
application. The precise nature of this misapplication will be ex-
amined shortly."'
D. Uncertainty
The previous discussions considered identification and factfind-
ing about past events, where the factfinder had as a starting point
some basic knowledge of the events. At the lower end of the proba-
bility spectrum, the consideration turns to fature contingent events
- events that would or might have occurred but for the interven-
tion of some other event. Here the attempt is made to assign some
numerical value to the probability that the future event would have
occurred.
An example is to be found in the area of damages for lost ex-
pectations, where two rules are frequently applied. One is the "all-
or-nothing" rule, whereby the plaintiff will win all that he would
have received if the event favorable to him had occurred, provided
his expectation expressed mathematically is greater than 50 percent;
if it is less than 50 percent plaintiff wins nothing.48 The other is
the simple mathematical probability theory, whereby plaintiff re-
ceives exactly the value of his expectation that the event would
have been favorable to him - that is, an amount proportionate to
his chance of winning."
4 5 See note 9 supra.
46people v. Collins, (Cal. unreported, Jan. 1965), noted in TIIM, Jan. 8, 1965, at
42. The case is treated in a more analytical manner by Kingston, Probability and Legal
Proceedings, 57 J. CraM. LC. & P.S. 93 (1966).
47 See section IV infra.
48 This is the majority rule in the United States. See C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §
31 (1935).
49 This is the prevailing rule in England. MAYE & MCGREGOR, DAMAGES 170-74
(12th ed. 1961). To illustrate the two rules, assume a box containing seven bills, four
$1 bills and three $10 bills. If a contestant is permitted to draw one bill and keep it
after payment of a certain fee, what is the expectation and possible damages, aside from
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In United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co.,"
a suit by a union against an employer for breach of contract, the
court adopted the rather novel view that the damages should be
based on the value of plaintiff's interest in the possibility of future
contracts with the defendant, as distinguished from the traditional
"lost profits" measure of damages in breach of a sales contract. The
damages awarded to the union represented future union dues cal-
culated on the prospective existence of a union contract for a given
number of years. It is not clear which test the court used, since it
awarded damages on the basis of the existing rate of union dues
and the actual yearly loss to the union at present rates projected
over a 20-year minimum life expectancy of the company. This is
not really a determination of the present value of the chance that
the contract would run for 20 years and might suggest that the
court was awarding the "all" of the "all-or-nothing" test. How-
ever, although the court did not indicate that the probability of the
union's obtaining future contracts exceeded 50 percent, it did talk
in terms of probable loss and observed that there was a considerable
difference between possibility and probability.
Applying either approach to this case, the reliability of the value
of the damages is limited by the accuracy of assigning a numerical
value to the probability that future contracts would have been made.
The utility and reliability of any application of mathematical proba-
bility rests on two factors: first, identifying the factors or variables
and second, assigning probability values to them. As expressed by
one writer commenting on this case:
The probability that two given parties would have made a future
contract had not one party severed the relationship is the sum of
the probable non-occurrence of all the facts that could prevent
the contract. To predict whether future contracts would have
materialized, the court must first determine which factors not to
consider. If it considered all of the facts that persuaded the
employer to abandon the Union in the first place, the probability
would have been zero and no damages awarded. In deciding what
factors to exclude, the court has two alternatives: (1) to exclude
out-of-pocket losses of the fee, if he is not permitted to make a drawing? Intuitively
his expectation will be equal to the fee charged for playing the game. The probability
of drawing a $1 bill is 4/7 and a $10 bill is 3/7. Expectation under the simple prob-
ability theory is determined by multiplying the mathematical probability that the future
event will be favorable by the full value of the future gain if it is favorable. The total
expectation is E - (4/7X$1)+(3/7X$10) = $4.86. However, under the "all-or-
nothing" rule, since the probability of winning one $10 bill is less than 50 percent
(3/7), plaintiff receives no $10 bill but since the probability of winning a $1 bill ex-
ceeds 50 percent (4/7), plaintiff will not receive 4/7 X $1 = 0.57 as above but the
full $1.
50 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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all the factors that the employer would use in deciding to end
the relation; or (2) to use the bad faith of the employer as a
standard. Still the court would be hard pressed to identify all
of the factors that could preclude future contracts even under
alternative (1) let alone to assign numerical values to the proba-
bility of each occurring.
Nation-wide or industry-wide statistics may report the number
of times some facts have occurred in the past, and this data may
be projected into the future. But factors that may prevent two
given parties from making future contracts do not exist inde-
pendent [sic] of each other. When the probability of one reaches
a certain level, the probability of others may increase or decrease;
and the statistical method cannot measure this interaction in a
specific factual complex. Many relevant factors themselves are
largely products of individual attitudes and company policies.51
A similar problem is faced in wrongful death actions involving
loss of future earnings. Assuming that it is more probable than
not that future employment would have materialized, then under
the "all-or-nothing" method the plaintiff in such an action might re-
ceive damages in an amount equal to the sum of the deceased's pro-
jected earnings over a life expectancy based on actuarial tables.
Under the probability theory, recovery would be had for the loss of
the chance that the employment would have continued (the sum of
the earnings for the life expectancy multiplied by the probability
that future employment would materialize). A court would face
the same nearly impossible task of assigning a numerical value to
that probability.52
Courts have taken opposite views as to the degree of the proba-
bility of expectation of receiving rewards for the capture of alleged
criminals. In Smitha v. Gentry53 the plaintiffs followed a suspected
criminal for whose capture a reward was offered by the State. Be-
coming convinced of the criminal's identity, they telephoned the
defendant, who they mistakenly believed to be a constable. The de-
fendant obtained the information, captured the criminal, and re-
ceived the reward. The court held that the plaintiffs could not re-
cover the reward from the defendant, since their damages were too
remote - their injury was only the loss of a naked possibility.
In McPeek v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,54 the wife of a
suspected murderer agreed to telegraph the plaintiff when she knew
51 Note, The Labor-Management Relationship: Present Damages For Loss of Future
Contracts, 71 YALE LJ. 563, 572-73 (1962).
52 See text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
5320 Ky. L. Rptr. 171, 45 S.W. 515 (Ct App. 1898).
54 107 Iowa 356, 78 N.W. 63 (1899).
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of her husband's whereabouts, so that the plaintiff could make the
arrest and collect the reward. Due to a delay by the defendant
which plaintiff claimed was negligent, the plaintiff failed to make
the arrest. Plaintiff sued for the reward. The court held that the
damages were not too remote and that whether plaintiff would in
all probability have succeeded was for the jury to determine. Al-
though the court did not indicate which rule was applied, it appears
that an "all-or-nothing" test was used, since plaintiff, under the
charge, could have received the entire reward.
Similar disagreement among courts is found in cases dealing
with the loss of the chance of winning a contest prize. In Chaplin
v. Hicks,55 an English case, plaintiff, one of 50 finalists in a beauty
contest, was disqualified as a result of defendant's failure to notify
her of an interview. The court sustained the jury's award of dam-
ages, even though the many contingencies involved made it impos-
sible to assess the value of plaintiff's loss. Since plaintiff was one
of 50 finalists competing for only three awards, the court was prob-
ably aware that her chance of winning was something less than 50
percent, yet still had some value. Clearly, this was not an applica-
tion of the "all-or-nothing" rule. But neither was it an application
of the simple mathematical probability rule, which involves reduc-
ing the chance to a numerical factor and multiplying that factor by
the full value of plaintiff's future possible gain. The basic defini-
tion of probability56 requires that all events, both favorable and un-
favorable, be equally likely to occur before probability theory is ap-
plicable. This is not the case here, since decisions by contest judges
are highly subjective.
In Adam's Express Co. v. Egbert,5" an early American case, the
court refused to place a value on such a contingent opportunity to
win a prize. The plaintiff, who had prepared architectural plans
for entrance into a competition, sued a carrier who had failed to
deliver his plans for breach of contract. The court denied damages
for loss of time and labor, observing that those costs would have
been lost in any case had plaintiff's competition for the prize proved
unsuccessful. The court said that plaintiff would have had to show
the probability of his winning in order to establish the value of his
lost chance. Assigning a numerical value to this probability would
have been an onerous task, since the winner would be selected on
55 [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
5 6 See note 3(a) supra.
57 36 Pa. 360 (1860).
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the basis of many factors, including subjective and personal determi-
nations of quality.58
In Wachtel v. National Alfalfa Journal Co.,59 reminiscent of the
Chaplin case, the court said that the jury, in awarding damages for
breach of contract to a contestant in a magazine contest who had
won in her district, could consider such factors as the number of
contestants, the number of prizes, plaintiff's position in the competi-
tion at the time the defendant cancelled the contest in her area, and
the reasonable probability of plaintiff's winning one of the prizes.
Similarly, although only 20 prizes were awarded among 23,548
contestants, the court in Mange v. Unicorn Press"° indicated that
plaintiff's chance (removed by breach of contract) had some value.
One writer" suggests that through statistical analysis one may
estimate the future probability of a subjective, personal judgment -
"personalistic" probability, as distinguished from objective or mathe-
matical probabilities. The author further suggests that the applica-
tion of mathematical probabilities may result in more accurate ver-
dicts, but that the notion that mathematical probability is directly
applicable to legal situations is probably invalid. At most it is rele-
vant and helpful. Because the chance is lost, or the future event
prevented from taking place, the legal verdict is not susceptible to
later verification of the sort that judgments of probability in busi-
ness or science receive when the event finally occurs.
IV. SELECTING VARIABLES AND ASSIGNING
PROBABILITY ODDS
Almost every judgment or verdict is dependent in some part on
probability. Quite often, however, the probabilities which the law
is called upon to consider are not easily expressed as or reduced to
58A case similar to Egbert, although not involving a contest, is Peyton v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 158 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1946), in which plaintiff sent a manu-
script to a literary critic in hopes that it would get approval, become published, become
a bestseller, and be made into a movie. Defendant failed to deliver it, and plaintiff
sued unsuccessfully for the value of possible book and movie rights. Plaintiff's success
as an author was based on a number of highly contingent factors, the failure of any one
of which, no matter how likely the others were to occur, would have spelled complete
failure for plaintiff. The court evidently considered all of the factors to be of low prob-
ability. To attempt to assign numerical values to the various contingent factors would,
again, have been an impossible task.
59 190 Iowa 1293, 176 N.W. 801 (1921).
60 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
01 Note, Damages Contingent Upon Chance, 18 RJTGERs L. REv. 875, 881-82, 892-
93 (1964). The author presents a detailed account of the uncertainty in applying math-
ematical probability to cases involving damages for lost future expectations.
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numerical values. There would be no disagreement among mathe-
maticians regarding the probability of drawing two black balls from
a box containing three red and four black balls,"2 because there is
a dosed system in which the probabilities may be determined mathe-
matically, and because all possible events - favorable and unfavor-
able - are equally likely to occur.
The criminal case considered earlier" also presents a dosed sys-
tem, at least as to the variables considered by the court. The closed
system is San Pedro, California, and the probabilities of some of the
variables considered could be determined mathematically to a fairly
high degree of reliability by using census reports, motor vehicle reg-
istrations, and other public records and statistics. Beyond this, how-
ever, there is a critical difference between the San Pedro case and
the red and black ball exercise: one of the most important consider-
ations in the use and reliability of a mathematical probability system
rests upon the selection of the factors or variables. Whereas the
box of colored balls offers a fixed set of variables, the San Pedro
situation introduces the danger of including nebulous and meaning-
less variables simply for the purpose of "ballooning" the numerical
odds to ridiculous proportions. Examples of such variables might
be that it was a clear day (when the rainfall in southern California
is negligible), that the event occurred at 11:10 a.m., that it was
Thursday, and that the woman was wearing slacks. The addition
to the formula of each new variable, whether or not it is relevant,
increases the mathematical odds against a duplicate occurrence.64
The selection of such variables requires a rational basis in fact.
The examples of irrelevant factors cited above have no more pe-
culiar relationship to this sequence of events nor to these defendants
than to any other events or defendants. These irrelevant factors
are not static conditions or striking and telling permanent physical
traits, but are subject to change and therefore can neither serve as
a basis for subsequent identification nor be subject to later verifica-
tion. In fact, even the relevant characteristics descriptive of the
couple in question and acceptable to the court, except the fact that
they were an interracial couple, were such that they could have been
dramatically changed prior to trial and simply not been available for
the purpose of identifying the defendants. The woman easily could
have adopted another hairstyle to replace her ponytail; she need not
6 2 See note 3 (c) supra.
63 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
64 See note 9 supra.
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have remained a blonde; the man could have shaved his beard and
painted the yellow Lincoln another color.
Moreover, even if care were taken to select only variables which
were dearly relevant, the San Pedro situation would still differ criti-
cally from the box-of-balls game, in that the probabilities to be as-
signed to each variable are themselves subject to question. Let us
take as an example the factor of the interracial couple. The only
reliable way to assign a numerical value to such a factor is to con-
sult census figures on interracial couples, if such figures are recorded.
But this rests upon a rather important assumption - that the two
were married. Why could not the bandits have been any white
woman and any Negro man who struck up an acquaintance in San
Pedro? If this were the case, census figures would be useless for
assigning a numerical value to this factor. Since there was no evi-
dence that the suspected couple were married, although the defend-
ants were, the assigned 1-to-1000 odds that the couple sought would
be Negro-white may have been far too great.
Implicit in another State's decision in a criminal case65 is the rec-
ognition of the applicability of compound probability theory to the
law. Although the court based its decision, at least in part, on that
law, it failed to face up to the critical questions affecting the re-
liability of the formula's use - proper selection of variables and
assignment of valid probability values. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland said, in a criminal proceeding where the State's case rested
upon the identification of the accused by the prosecuting witness as
the man who assaulted her, and upon the accumulation of circum-
stances tending to corroborate her testimony, that: "None of these
circumstances, standing alone, would prove conclusively that appel-
lant was the guilty man, but taken together they constitute a chain
of circumstantial evidence tending to corroborate the testimony of
the prosecuting witness . "..."66
The first three circumstances mentioned in the footnote would
fall near the uncertain end of the spectrum. These factors do not
lend themselves to subsequent verification. It would be nearly im-
65 Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1945). The circumstances
cited by the court were: (1) the defendant boarded the streetcar near the scene of the
crime a short time after the assault was committed, (2) he had blood on his coat, (3)
the blood on the coat was of a type different from that of Elizabeth Moore with whom
he said he had had a fight, (4) the blood was of the same type as that of the victim
(prosecuting witness), (5) the prosecuting witness was bleeding, with blood running
into her eyes and onto her clothes after the assault, and (6) blood of that type was found
in the snow at the scene of the assault.
66 Id. at 442, 45 A.2d at 89.
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possible to assign to them numerical values that had any realistic
meaning. Such evidence is far more susceptible to the drawing of
inferences than to the assigning of mathematical probabilities. No
doubt strong inferences may be drawn from such evidence but hard-
ly precise, reliable mathematical conclusions based on probability
statistics.
But this is not the limit of the potential danger from including
irrelevant factors. Their treatment can be equally baneful. For
example, let us again consider the San Pedro case. Assume that the
Negro represents the same proportion (6 percent) of the popula-
tion in San Pedro as in California.67 If we assume a closed system
of 100 persons, six Negro and 94 white, and of the six, three were
male, and of the 94, 47 were female, we could determine the pure
mathematical probability that any two people would be grouped as
Negro male-white female.6 8 That probability is 3/100 X 47/100
= 1.41/100. Obviously these odds are considerably less than the
assigned odds of 1/1000. Further distortions will arise if we split
our sample group into two dosed systems - males in one and fe-
males in the other. In the first we have 47 white males and three
Negro males and in the other, 47 white females and three Negro
females. The probability of selecting one white female and one
Negro male is 3/50 X 47/50 = 1.41/25.
We may further alter the odds by splitting our sample group on
the basis of color - 47 white females and 47 white males in one
system and three Negro males and three Negro females in the other
system. The probability for the same arrangement as in the first
two situations is 1/2 X 1/2 = 1/4. This kind of manipulation is
possible because here there were more distinguishing characteristics
(sex and color) between the events than there were in the earlier
example (color only)."
As we have seen in the San Pedro case the selection of the in-
terracial couple was based not only upon an unverified assumption,
but it was one that may have been chosen for its emotional appeal
and thus may have prejudiced the defendants.
67 U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION, STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 27 (86th
ed. 1965). These figures are based on the 1960 census. No statistics are recorded for
the Negro-white percentages in the San Pedro population. There are figures on the
white-nonwhite percentages in the population, but it was felt that these figures would
be no more accurate than those selected for the purpose of analysis since the nonwhite
population in San Pedro includes a high percentage of people of Mexican and Indian
ancestry.
68 See note 7 sapra, example 2.
69 See note 7 supra, example 1.
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Similar distortion and inaccuracy lurks in the area of interpreta-
tion of such probability expressions, even after proper selection of
relevant factors, assignment of valid probabilities, and proper treat-
ment of the factors. For example, assume that the question of fact
is whether a given toss of a coin was heads or tails. If it is estab-
lished that on nine successive tosses of the coin previous to the one
in question it came up tails, -it could not be argued that, since the
odds were 1/21" = 1/1024, or 1023 to 1, against tossing 10 tails
in succession,7" the probability in favor of a head on the toss in ques-
tion (the 10th toss) was also 1023 to 1. The crux of the matter
involves a perspective in time. The probability of tossing 10 suc-
cessive tails at a point in time prior to tossing the coin for the first
time or prior to the occurrence of any of the 10 independent events,
is 1023 to 1 against. The probability of getting heads or tails on
any given toss just prior to that single toss is one in two (1/2) re-
gardless of whether it is the first or the 10th toss.
To say that nine successive tails had been tossed is simply to say
that what was 511 to 1 against occurring, before any of the succes-
sive independent events occurred, had in fact happened. However,
the fact that nine tosses had been made previously would be relevant
to and probative of the question whether any one of the nine tosses
resulted in tails or what the probability was that out of nine tosses
of a coin, one toss would be a tail. This is so because the probabil-
ity of tossing either a head or a tail increases and approaches a limit
of 1/2 as the number of tosses increases.
The inclusion of irrelevant factors in the algebraic expression of
compound probability increases the odds against the occurrence of
a similar situation duplicating those factors under consideration.
Where such odds are high, the layman tends to accept the conclu-
sion suggested by or flowing from them as conclusive; and, where
they are low, he tends to reject the conclusion without consideration
of the underlying facts.
Perhaps it could be argued that, when compound probability is
applied to a number of individual factors whose individual odds are
relatively small but whose collective odds are extremely high, the
resulting postulate should not be accepted as conclusive but only be
given its proper weight by the trier of fact. Other factors whose in-
dividual probability odds are extremely high without the application
of compound probability (e.g. actuary tables, blood tests) perhaps
should be accepted as conclusive.
70 See note 3 (a) supra, example 2.
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Factors may be interdependent;7 that is, their probability odds
may vary inversely or directly with conditions or with each other.
Contrary to the ballooning effect, if the probability of any one fac-
tor selected is or approaches zero, their product and the conclusion
based thereon, strictly speaking, is negligible and approaches zero;
no matter how likely the other dependent events are to occur, the
ultimate or combined independent event in issue would be unlikely
to occur.
72
Without going further, we can appreciate the importance not
only of the selection of variables and factors but of the treatment of
them as well. In the world of the lawyer, there is likely to be little
data upon which a mathematical expression of the probabilities in-
volved in determining an issue of fact in litigation can be validly
based. Nevertheless, a rational judgment may often be made in
which numerical probabilities, while not conclusive, may be con-
sidered as enlighteninig, so long as care is exercised in selecting the
system and the variables, and in realizing what is sought to be dem-
onstrated by each factor. The dangers in judicial use of mathemati-
cal probability theory lie not in the theory itself, but rather in its
high susceptibility to misuse.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTITIONER
As we have seen,73 when the subject in question involves a
dosed system and the subject or event is susceptible to subsequent
verification, sophisticated devices are available for measuring or
counting the frequency of occurrence of that event, and reliable
probabilities may be empirically assigned by experts in the event.
Absent such circumstances (a closed system), resort should be had
to experts in statistical and mathematical probability."4 It is prob-
71 See notes 51 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
72 The product of any two or more algebraic or arithmetic factors will be zero if
any one of the factors is zero. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
73 See text accompanying notes 63 & 64 supra.
74 The process which describes the reduction of individual probabilities to their nu-
merical equivalents involves three techniques. The first technique is one in which the
probability can be determined mathematically within a closed system, that is, a sample
space in which every possible result, called sample points, can be described and identified.
It is necessary that probabilities be assigned to each of the sample points in the sample
space before applying, for example, compound probability. See note 9 supra. Since
the interpretation of probability is going to be stated in terms of frequency, the proba-
bility that is assigned to a given sample point should be approximately equal to the
proportion of times that the sample point will be obtained, or is expected to be obtained,
in a large number of repetitions. This frequency interpretation of probability requires
that probabilities be positive and that the sum of the probabilities assigned to the sample
points be equal to one. A more advanced discussion of this method is beyond the scope
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ably not the province of the lawyer to assign probability figures in
the first instance to events with which he has little acquaintance.
Perhaps it should be pointed out at this juncture that what has
just been said focuses on the essential question raised by the Risley
court's rejection of the expert's testimony;75 that is, whether a
mathematician, expert in the theory and application of statistical and
mathematical probability, can state his opinion as to the occurrence
or frequency of occurrence of a given event, or whether only one
expert in the event may do so acceptably. If the answer embraces
the latter, this suggests that a mathematician should not be allowed
to state what are the mathematical odds in favor of or against the
occurrence of a given event unless such occurrence first has been
reduced, or can be subsequently verified, to an actuarial certainty.
To argue that statistical and mathematical probability theory is in-
apposite to any situation except that found in a closed system where
all factors or elements may be empirically established is too narrow
and restrictive a view of this discipline.
For the attorney it would seem that the critical question involves
the selection of relevant factors rather than the initial assignment
of probability. The latter is properly the job of the mathematician,
actuarian, or statistician. In selecting such factors the attorney by
practice and training is particularly suited for the task.
It may be argued that, since the factors selected are generally in
evidence, they should meet the admissibility standard of and be se-
lected on the same basis as any evidence sought to be introduced.
First of all, such factors should be found to be relevant. Second,
they ought not to be excluded by any of the specific rules of evi-
dence. Finally, although relevant and otherwise admissible, their
use should not so prejudice the party against whom they are sought
to be used as to outweigh whatever probative value they possess.
Perhaps a standard resembling a "residuum of legal evidence"
of this article. For such a discussion, see P. HOEL, supra note 3, §§ 6.1, 8.2, 8.3, 9, 10,
12.
The second technique is one in which estimates of past experience are projected into
the future to provide reasonably accurate predictions of the likelihood of occurrence of
similar future events, provided the sample space is large enough to neutralize the effect
of statistical error. Acturial tables are an example of this technique. The last technique
that includes judgment, consideration of known factors and past experience, disregard
of unpredictable events or human factors, and which combines these subjective con-
siderations, is of the type illustrated by the I.as Vegas' bookmakers establishing odds on
sporting events (aside from the effect that betting may have on such odds) and demon-
strated by the experts in the Risley and Howland cases. See text accompanying notes
8-20 supra.
765 See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
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rule appears to be too strict, but beyond this the attorney who is
aware of the effect of irrelevant factors on the meaning and accur-
acy of the conclusions based on compound probability law should
be guided by his notions of propriety and fair play and desire for
objective accuracy.
VI. THE UTILITY OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY
Mathematical probability is particularly useful where predictions
and identifications can be made under circumstances that permit a
degree of uniformity in and reproducibility of results that to the
scientist approaches certainty. It is useful in considering the ex-
istence of certain facts whose existence can be subsequently and in-
dependently empirically verified.76 A New Jersey court77 has rec-
ognized the validity of voice identification techniques and the dis-
tinguishable characteristics of the human voice, by compelling a
criminal defendant to submit to a tape recording for the purpose of
comparing his voice with that of an unknown speaker. Perhaps in
the near future this same court or another will accept into evidence
identification by "voiceprint.""8
In the case of lie detector devices, however, there is a critical
shortcoming. Test results are designed to say something with re-
gard to the subject's state of mind. Aside from the unresolved con-
stitutional questions,"M the argument against the use of polygraph or
other truth-seeking devices is that such methods have not yet been
recognized or accepted by the scientific community."0 Presumably
until that occurs, the legal community is not likely to do so. The
polygraph, for example, operates on the theory that a person telling
a lie undergoes definitely ascertainable physiological reactions
whereas the person telling the truth will show only "normal" re-
76 See section III supra.
7 7 State v. McKenna, 94 N.J. Super. 71, 226 A.2d 757 (Essex County Ct. 1967).
78 This method of identification is based upon the scientist's conviction that the
frequencies, loudness, and duration of certain basic phonetic elements, and the energy
distribution of the human voice, all of which vary with a number of physiological vari-
ables, result in an individual's voiceprint pattern being as unique as his fingerprints.
Because of the many combinations and permutations of these variables, it is highly im-
probable that any two voices would be identical. Thus, to the scientist at least, voice-
prints can be used to make a positive identification.
79 See generally A. WEsrIN, PRIvAcY AND FREEDoM 373 (1967). The author
argues that lie detector devices should be used only in situations in which the individual
freely consents to their use.
80 People v. Boney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963); Colbert v. Common-
wealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957). See also Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306
(1952).
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actions. What is measured, then, is physiological change in the sub-
ject, presumably generated by emotional stress. The obvious diffi-
calty with this is that these physiological changes may be caused by
many stimuli other than lying.
It is suggested there is also a reluctance on the part of the courts
to substitute expert opinion on the credibility of testimony for the
judgment of the trier of fact.8"
It would seem that other parameters or criteria unique to falsify-
ing, or to a state of mind particularly peculiar thereto, must be iden-
tified before the scientist accepts such tests as exhibiting the degree
of accuracy that fingerprints, blood tests, or others now show.
Mathematical probability is useful in identifying certain individ-
uals and in establishing legal or causal relationships between past
events and such individuals by showing the correlation between or
similarity of certain physiological, genetic, psychic, or other charac-
teristics of the individual and certain like characteristics known to
have existed or to have been related to the event in question.
It is in this area that compound probability is most apposite.
This is true because, although in certain situations each separate
characteristic or event may be actuarially shown to exist at a certain
rate or frequency and thereby provide a certain degree of reliabil-
ity, it is the existence or occurrence of a combination of such char-
acteristics or events that tends to establish conclusively the identity
or relationship in question. Although certain events occur frequent-
ly and certain features appear often, it is the unlikelihood based on
compound probability that the same combination of features would
appear in another person or that the same combination of events
would occur more than once that tends to establish the fact.
It would follow then that in those areas where the facts in ques-
tion do not occur because some condition precedent does not, and
where as a result there is no subsequent verification of the fact, or
where no data is available as to the frequency of occurrence of cer-
tain events, then mathematical probability is not a very reliable or
useful tool. It is not particularly useful as an aid for predicting
future events where there is no history of similar past events or
where the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event is dependent
upon other factors or personal, subjective judgments not susceptible
of present identification.
Mathematical probability is thus most useful in establishing the
existence of or identifying facts relating to past events and least use-
81See A. WEsTrN, supra note 79.
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ful in the predicting of future events and in those legal situations
(e.g., computation of damages in breach of contract actions) where
the chance is lost or the future event prevented from taking place.
VII. CONCLUSION
The great difficulty in applying the rules of compound proba-
bility to the data of evidence lies in the fact that it is a mathematical
concept and, as such, appears to lawyers and jurors to be esoteric, in
spite of its simplicity. While laymen may accept the assignment of
numerical values to the probability of separate events, they may yet
resist accepting the conclusion (i.e., the probability resulting from
the product) which follows logically from fundamental laws of
probability, particularly where the odds are relatively low.
Just the opposite may be argued where the odds are, for exam-
ple, 12 million to 1 as in the San Pedro case, or 4 billion to 1 as in
the Risley case. There the criticism is that such evidence would
urge a conclusive effect upon juries, without the usual weighing of
probability in which the trier of fact engages. The sheer weight of
overwhelming mathematical odds might suggest to the jury a deci-
sion in conformity with those odds as the only possible verdict.
It is submitted, however, that these lurking dangers of misevalu-
ation should not serve as a basis for total rejection of probability
theory as a factfinding tool. As with any other variety of scientific
evidence, the proper approach would seem to be to concentrate, first,
upon assuring that a proper basis is laid for the invocation of the
mathematical process, and, second, upon the proper instruction to
jurors as to the effect to be given the result.
Provided the numerical probability assigned to the occurrence
of a given event is based upon valid considerations, and the factors,
variables, or events are selected with justification, the application of
the laws of statistical and mathematical probability introduces into
the law a concept no different from that of giving weight to any
circumstantial evidence by the trier of fact. The rules of probability
simply give a more definitive picture of the relative value of this
type of evidence.
